
































 “Globalization increases poverty” is a common assertion made by critics of globalization. 
The proliferation of low-wage jobs and higher food prices are some of the arguments brought 
forward in support of this argument. One of the hallmarks of globalization is the systematic 
dismantling of barriers to trade. Advocates of trade liberalization – particularly industrialized 
country agriculture reform – argue that the ensuing rise in world prices for agriculture products 
will boost rural incomes, thereby reducing poverty in the poorest countries, where the bulk of 
world poverty resides. Who is right? The goal of this paper is take a systematic look at the 
structure of poverty across a range of developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
and explore how national poverty rates in some of the poorest countries in the world are likely to 
be affected by global trade liberalization. 
Our analysis of the structure of poverty is based on national household surveys from 14 
developing countries. While we consider both spending and earnings effects of trade 
liberalization, it is argued that the earnings effects will generally be the dominant factor. This is 
particularly true in the short run for households that are highly specialized in their earnings 
patterns. Consider the case of a self-employed farm household. Assuming that trade liberalization 
results in higher farm prices, we expect the short run effect on the returns to family labor and land 
to be positive, and somewhat larger in percentage terms (the so-called “magnification effect”). 
Furthermore, if this household is not employed off-farm, then the farm profitability effect 
translates directly into an income effect, and this is likely to be sufficient to lift some of the farm 
households out of poverty. Of course this same effect can work in reverse, with commodity price 
declines increasing poverty. This makes specialized households highly vulnerable to trade policy 
shocks. 
In addition to agriculture-specialized households, we focus on self-employed non-agriculture 
specialized households, households specialized in wage labor and those relying on transfer 
payments for 95% or more of their income. Together, these four types of specialized households 
account for an average of 56% of the poor in the 14 countries examined. Thus a majority of the 
poor have specialized earnings patterns and are likely to be disproportionately affected by trade 
liberalization. The same is not true of the non-poor, where a majority of the households are 
diversified, and are therefore less vulnerable to sector-specific commodity price changes. We also 
find that the poor are over-represented among the agriculture-specialized households.  
With this background, we turn to an examination of the broad effects of multilateral trade 
liberalization on relative commodity prices and factor returns across the 14 countries in question. 
We distinguish between per capita effects – or the impact of trade liberalization on the “average” 
household in each country, and the effects on the poorest households. Our per capita results are 
quite similar to other studies of multila teral trade liberalization, with most countries gaining 
modestly, while a few gain substantially and a few lose due to the erosion of benefits from 
existing preferences. Some argue that this “rising tide will lift all boats” and so the positive per 
capita gains from trade liberalization will reduce poverty. However, we show that the short run 
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impact of trade liberalization on different household groups is quite varied, and not always 
positive.  
First of all, global trade liberalization tends to raise food prices – particularly for staples, relative 
to non-food prices. This is true in all but 2 of the countries in our sample. This food price hike has 
an adverse effect on the poor, relative to the per capita  household, since they spend a 
disproportionate share of their income on food. Also, the short run earnings impacts are quite 
varied, with agricultural profits rising relative to per capita income in 11 of the 14 countries, 
while relative non-agricultural profits and wages fall in many of these countries. Thus the overall 
impact on poverty depends on the structure of poverty in each country – hence our emphasis on 
this topic. 
We proceed to systematically explore the impact of trade liberalization on poverty utilizing a 
recently developed analytical framework that combines the detailed household survey data with a 
global economic model in order to measure the poverty impacts of trade liberalization on the five 
different household strata in each country. Each of the first four strata corresponds to one of the 
groups of earnings-specialized households, while the fifth encompasses the diversified 
households in each country. We conduct our analysis at the level of one hundred income 
percentiles, ranging from poorest to richest in each stratum. In this way, we uncover the 
differential impact of trade liberalization, by country, stratum and by income level. We also 
calculate the change in poverty rates, both at the stratum and national levels. Our findings 
emphasize the differential short run poverty impacts of multilateral trade liberalization on poverty 
across countries, across strata, and within strata, thereby highlighting the links between the 
structure of poverty and the national impacts of trade liberalization. 
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I.  Introduction 
 “Globalization increases poverty” is a common assertion made by critics of globalization. 
The proliferation of low-wage jobs and higher food prices are some of the arguments brought 
forward in support of this argument. One of the hallmarks of globalization is the systematic 
dismantling of barriers to trade. Advocates of trade liberalization often argue that “a rising tide 
lifts all boats” and the economy-wide gains from trade liberalization will make everyone better 
off. More refined arguments in favor of poverty reduction ensuing from trade liberalization often 
emphasize the ensuing rise in world prices for agriculture products as industrialized countries 
eliminate protection for farming in OECD countries. This is expected to boost incomes in the 
rural economies of the developing world, where the bulk of world poverty resides. Who is right? 
The goal of this paper is take a systematic look at the structure of poverty across a range of 
developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and explore how poverty rates in some 
of the poorest countries in the world are likely to be affected by global trade liberalization. 
The linkages between trade liberalization and poverty have been receiving a great deal of 
attention in recent years. At the 1999 Geneva conference on the WTO and the developing 
countries, Joseph Stiglitz, then Vice President of the World Bank, proposed that the next round of 
WTO negotiations be labeled the “Development Round” and that it incorporate an explicit 
emphasis on poverty reduction. This direction was reinforced by Mike Moore who was Director 
General of the WTO at the time. The current WTO Round was subsequently dubbed the Doha 
Development Round.3 In light of this growing interest in the topic, the Swedish Parliament, in 
cooperation with the Trade Research Division of the World Bank, sponsored a conference in 
Stockholm in October of 2000 aimed at a quantitative assessment of the links between trade 
liberalization and poverty. The Globkom conference drew together economists working with 
household surveys (Levinsohn, Barry and Friedman, 1999; Case, 1998; Friedman, 2001; 
Ianchovichina, Nicita and Solaga, 2000), as well as researchers using taking a more macro-
economic approach (Devarajan and van der Mensbrugghe, 2000; Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr, 
2002; Hertel, Preckel and Cranfield, 2000).4 The most striking thing about this conference was 
the extent of disagreement about the right approach to analyzing this linkage. Winters (2000) 
offers an overview and Reimer (2002) provides a survey of contributions on this topic. It seems 
fair to say that researchers are still struggling to reach a consensus on the best approach to 
analyzing the impacts of multilateral trade liberalization on poverty, let alone agreeing on the 
answer.  
Historically most poverty research has focused on consumption side of the question – since that is 
easier to measure, more reliable, and less volatile than income (Lipton and Ravallion, 2000). 
However, it is clear that one cannot assess the likely impact of trade liberalization on poverty 
without considering both the consumption and earnings sides of the problem. Our analysis of the 
trade-poverty linkage is based on national household surveys from 14 developing countries. 
While we consider both spending and earnings effects of trade liberalization, it is argued that the 
earnings effects will generally be the dominant factor. This is particularly true in the short run for 
households that are highly specialized in their earnings patterns. Consider the case of a self-
                                                                 
3 See also the handbook on trade liberalization and poverty by McCullogh, Winters and Cirera (2001). 
4 Other good examples are offered by Cogneau and Robilliard (2000), Bourguignon Robilliard and Robinson (2000), 
Decaluwé, Patry, Savard and Thorbecke (1999), and Löfgren (1999). 
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employed farm household. Assuming that trade liberalization results in higher farm prices, we 
expect the short run effect on the returns to family labor and land to be positive, and somewhat 
larger in percentage terms (the so-called “magnification effect”). Furthermore, if this household is 
not employed off-farm, then the farm profitability effect translates directly into an income effect, 
and this is likely to be sufficient to lift some of the farm households out of poverty. Of course this 
same effect can work in reverse, with commodity price declines increasing poverty. This makes 
specialized households highly vulnerable to trade policy shocks. The next section of the paper 
examines the degree of earnings specialization among the poor, and hence their vulnerability to 
trade liberalization. 
II. The Structure of Poverty in Fourteen Developing Countries 
 Table 1 lists the fourteen countries for which we have obtained and processed household 
survey data on earnings. These countries were selected based on the intersection of data 
availability and overlap with countries covered in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data 
base which will be used to simulate the impacts of trade liberalization later in this paper. Our 
sample of countries is arranged in ascending order, according to GDP/capita (at PPP = purchasing 
power parity prices). By this measure, the three Sub-Sahara African countries, Malawi, Zambia 
and Uganda, are the poorest in our sample. They are followed by four of the five Southeast Asian 
countries: Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. With the exception of Thailand, 
the Latin American countries in our sample are the richest, measured on a PPP-GDP per capita 
basis, with Chile and Mexico showing the highest incomes.  
Table 1 reports three important types of information on a country/stratum basis. The first of these 
is the share of the total population allocated to each of the four categories of specialization, as 
well as to the diversified group. Beginning with the column corresponding to households 
specialized in agriculture (the agricultural stratum), we see that Malawi shows the highest 
concentration of population in this category (38%), while Mexico shows the lowest (3%). This 
suggests that there might be an inverse correlation between per capita  GDP and the share of the 
population specialized in agriculture. Figure 1 plots the latter against the former and confirms this 
point. With few exceptions – most notably Vietnam, which is relatively poor but has amongst the 
lowest share of its population in the specialized agricultural stratum – there is a strong negative 
correlation between these two variables.  
The non-agriculture and transfer stratums’ concentration in the overall population show no 
particularly strong correlation with income, or with the continent in question for that matter. 
However, in the case of the labor stratum there appears to be a strong positive correlation with 
per capita GDP. Uganda and Vietnam show the lowest share of wage and salary-specialized 
households in the sample (just 4%), whereas Mexico shows the highest share (38%). Figure 2 
plots the labor stratum share in the population against per capita  GDP, confirming the positive 
relationship between these variables. This makes sense, since richer economies typically exhibit a 
higher degree of specialization, with lower levels of informal employment, and a larger formal 
labor market.  
The share of the population in the diversified stratum in Table 1 is simply one minus the sum of 
the four specialized shares. This ranges from 0.87 in Vietnam and 0.83 in Uganda to 0.26 in 
Zambia, and shows little correlation with income or geography. 
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With this perspective on the stratum profile of the population as a whole , we next turn to the two 
poverty-related measures in Table 1. The first of these (the middle entry in each cell) reports the 
share of the national poverty total appearing in each of the strata. Like the population shares, 
these measures sum to one across each row. Perhaps not surprisingly, the poorest countries 
(Malawi, Zambia), with a large share of the ir total population specialized in agriculture, also 
show a large share of total poverty in this stratum. This positive correlation between the share of 
agricultural specialized households in the population and their share in total poverty is 
highlighted in Figure 3. Most interesting are the exceptions to this general trend. For example, in 
Brazil – one of the richest countries in the sample  in which self-employed agricultural households 
comprise just 4% of the population – this stratum accounts for nearly one-quarter of the poor!  
One of the most important comparisons between the first and second rows of Table 1 is for the 
diversified (i.e. non-specialized) households. With the exception of Thailand and Indonesia, the 
poor appear to be more specialized than the population at large, and therefore, more specialized 
than the non-poor. This is particularly striking in the Latin American countries where the share of 
diversified households in the general population is often 20 percentage points above the share of 
diversified households amongst the poor. The sample average share of diversified households in 
the general population is 51% vs. just 44% in the case of the sample average for the poor 
households.5 With more specialized income sources, the poor are likely to be more vulnerable to 
trade policy shocks which result in sharp swings in returns to sector-specific factors of 
production. 
We next turn to the poverty rate, or headcount, which is the third entry in Table 1. This reports 
the share of the population (stratum or total) that is in poverty. Running an eye down the Total 
column, it is evident that the poverty rate tends to decrease with increasing income. It is highest 
in Malawi (65%) and Zambia (73%) and lowest in Thailand (2%) and Chile (4%). This negative 
relationship is graphed in Figure 4. Clearly if the distribution of income were constant across 
income levels, then higher per capita  income would always lift more people out of poverty. 
However, as the Gini coefficients reported in parentheses in the first column of Table 1 indicate, 
the degree of inequality varies widely within this sample of countries. Mexico, for example, has a 
very unequal distribution of income so that the proportion of the population living on less than 
$1/day is still 15%, despite the Mexican per capita GDP of $9,000.  
In order to understand the structure of poverty in these developing countries, it is also important 
to consider the intensity of poverty across the different earnings strata. If trade liberalization lifts 
incomes in a stratum exhibiting a high intensity of poverty, then this will have a beneficial impact 
on the overall poverty rate, even if incomes fall somewhat in other strata. In order to explore this 
dimension of poverty in our sample of developing countries, we plot the stratum poverty rate 
against the national poverty rate in each country, for each of the specialized strata in turn. These 
scatter plots are shown in Figures 5 – 8. The first of these figures shows that, with the exception 
of the Philippines and Brazil, the incidence of poverty among transfer-specialized households is 
always larger than that in the general population. The most extreme divergence is for Peru, where 
80% of the transfer-specialized households are in poverty, as opposed to just 16% of the general 
population. Most countries also lie above the 45 degree line in Figure 6 which plots the poverty 
rate among agriculture-specialized households against the national poverty rate. For example, in 
                                                                 
5 We also provide a national population-weighted average of the national survey data at the bottom of Table 1. For 
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Colombia, the poverty rate amongst self-employed agricultural households is more than twice the 
national average. 
In contrast to the transfer and agricultural strata, the poverty rates amongst the diversified 
households in most countries lie somewhat below the 45° line, indicating that they are less poor 
than average (Figure 7). And, with the exceptions of Venezuela, Bangladesh and Vietnam, 
poverty rates amongst the wage and salary-specialized households are substantially lower than in 
the population at large (Figure 8).  
III. Assessing the Impacts of Trade Liberalization 
Over the past decade it has become quite common for researchers to assess the national, 
per capita impacts of global trade liberalization. Such studies formed the cornerstone of the 
World Bank’s assessment of the final Uruguay Round Agreement on the developing countries 
(Martin and Winters, 1996), and they have been widely used in assessing the potential national 
consequences of further cuts in protection under the Doha Development Round. The most widely 
used analytical framework for this purpose is the GTAP data base and modeling framework 
(Hertel, 1997; Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002) and this is what we use here. Since this tool is 
well-documented elsewhere6, we will not go into detail on this aspect in the current paper. We 
will focus instead on the results and their implications for poverty. 
Barriers to Merchandise Trade:  Table 2 summarizes the extent of protection currently in place 
in the 14 developing countries in our sample, and compares it with protection levels in other 
developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as other developing 
countries and the OECD. From this table we see that tariffs remain quite high throughout the 
developing world. While the bulk of the world’s trade involves non-food manufactured imports 
into the OECD, where tariffs average just 2%, average tariffs on non-food and non-textile 
manufacturing imports into developing countries are still quite high, reaching 22% in Malawi. 
Furthermore, tariffs on textiles and apparel are even higher in the developing countries, and these 
also remain relatively high in the OECD as a whole. In fact, the global average level of protection 
on textiles and apparel is five and one-half times higher than for other non-food manufactures 
taken as a group. Clearly global trade liberalization can be expected to have a significant impact 
on the apparel trade – much of which is relatively unskilled labor intensive. This, in turn, is likely 
to affect undeclared wages, upon which many of the poor depend for their income. 
Turning to the agriculture and processed food columns of Table 2, we see that OECD protection 
is very high, relative to non-food imports. Furthermore, the average tariff on processed foodstuffs 
imported into the OECD is quite a bit higher than that for primary agricultural products, giving an 
indication of potential tariff-escalation. The highest tariffs on primary agriculture imports are for 
Uganda and the “Rest of Asia”, while Vietnam shows by far the highest average tariff on 
processed food products. Other primary products show lower tariff rates in most cases.  
Trade Liberalization Results: To keep things simple, and to identify the maximum potential 
impact of trade liberalization on poverty, our simulation experiment involves elimination of all 
the import barriers listed in Table 2. In addition, we remove agricultural export subsidies, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
most measures this is similar to the simply average. 
6 The interested reader is referred to the GTAP web site at: www.gtap.org 
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reported to the WTO (Elbehri, 2002). We do not alter domestic support for agriculture, as the 
economic impact of these subsidies and the extent to which they will be reduced in any future 
WTO agreement remains contentious.  
Table 3 reports key results from this experiment. We focus first on the per capita earnings 
impacts of trade liberalization. These price changes are relative to the numeraire, which is the 
average earnings index worldwide. The average percentage increase in private household 
earnings in each of the 14 focus countries is reported in the first column of Table 3. With the 
exception of Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, these developing countries all experience a real 
appreciation of the average earnings for land, labor and capital, relative to the world as a whole. 
This means that the demand for their services has increased, relative to supply. If consumer prices 
were unchanged, then the per capita  household in these eleven countries would be 
unambiguously better off.  
However, the prices that consumers must pay for goods and services also increase in most cases, 
relative to the numeraire, (column CPI) so one must compare the two to evaluate the per capita 
welfare impacts of trade liberalization on these countries (column Real Income). On this basis, we 
observe that per capita  real income rises in every case excepting Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, 
where the change in CPI dominates the earnings effect of trade liberalization. The largest per 
capita gain in real income arises in Vietnam, followed by Malawi. Most countries show a modest 
positive (less than one percent) per capita gain from trade liberalization. These findings are quite 
consistent with the per capita  results from most studies of multilateral trade liberalization which 
typically show that most, but often not all developing countries gain from trade liberalization, and 
these gains are typically rather modest in scope (e.g., the studies collected in Martin and Winters, 
1996). The goal of such studies is typically to explore the reasons behind these differential gains 
and we refer the reader to these earlier studies for more analysis of the per capita  effects of global 
trade liberalization. Instead, we turn to the differential impacts of trade liberalization on 
household groups within each of these economies. 
Consider the relative earnings impacts of trade liberalization as reported in Table 3. Here, the 
percentage changes in profits and wages are reported relative to national per capita  earnings in 
each country. Note that, with three exceptions 7, agricultural profits rise relative to average 
earnings. The reason why returns to agriculture in most developing countries rise, relative to other 
returns, is due to the high level of protection for agriculture in the OECD countries. With 
agricultural profits rising, it is perhaps not surprising that relative non-agricultural profits fall in 
most countries, with the exceptions being Bangladesh, Mexico and Vietnam. The remaining 
arguments in overall earnings, wages and salaries also fall, relative to the average, in all countries 
but 4 (unskilled labor) or 3 (skilled labor). However, within the labor earnings category, unskilled 
wages rise relative to skilled wages in every case but Bangladesh and Uganda.  
On the consumer goods side, we also see some common patterns across countries. Food prices 
rise, relative to the CPI, in all countries but Mexico and Vietnam, whereas manufactures prices 
                                                                 
7 The exceptions are Mexico, Uganda and Vietnam. Mexico already has free trade in manufactures with its most 
important trading partner – the United States – but its agriculture sector remains protected. Once these barriers are 
removed, agricultural profits decline. The decline in Uganda is quite small, but the relative decline in Vietnam is very 
large and has to do with the strong income in input costs as the rest of the economy expands vigorously in response to 
tariff cuts in light manufacturers. 
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falls, relative to the CPI, across the board. This decline in the consumer’s cost of non-food items 
is directly related to the relatively high tariffs on these goods (recall Table 2), coupled with the 
relative decline in world prices for these products.8 Services prices rise in every country but Peru, 
following multilateral trade liberalization. 
IV. Implications for Poverty 
 Having examined the structure of poverty across our sample of 14 developing countries, 
and having ascertained the likely changes in relative prices following trade liberalization, we are 
now in a position to assess the implications for poverty. We will do so in a way that facilitates 
comparison across countries, attempting to isolate the different structural features driving the 
differential changes in poverty, by stratum, as well as nationally. Our results will be presented in 
terms of percentage changes in the poverty headcount rate in each stratum, compared to the 
national population. These headcount rates have the virtue of being additive across strata, with the 
row sum equaling the national poverty headcount rate. They may be obtained by multiplying the 
middle cell in Table 1 (share of stratum in total poverty) by the overall poverty headcount rate 
reported as the row sum of the third entry in Table 1. These alternative poverty rates are reported 
for each stratum/country combination in Table 4. 
With prices, consumption patterns and incomes changing in the wake of trade liberalization, it is 
not immediately obvious how one would go about assessing the likely change in poverty. In this 
paper we follow the approach laid out in Hertel et al. (2003) in which a micro-simulation model is 
used. Specifically, we divide each of the five strata into one hundred household groups, organized 
by income level. Each group represents one percent of the population in the stratum. For each of 
these groups we perform a welfare calculation, based on an econometrically estimated utility 
function describing their consumption behavior and our survey-based estimates of their 
endowments (e.g., skilled labor, agricultural profits, etc.). Prior to our simulation, we establish the 
poverty level of “utility” for each country. This corresponds to the level of well-being attainable 
by a household earning $1/day – our absolute poverty line. The household with this level of 
utility is termed the “marginal” household or the household on the edge of poverty. Once we 
obtain the post-liberalization prices, we can re-compute income, as well as consumption and the 
utility level for each percentile in each stratum. The latter variable  permits us to assess whether a 
given household has risen out of poverty, or whether it has fallen into poverty as a result of the 
trade liberalization experiment. 
We conduct the poverty analysis in stages, in order to emphasize the importance of various 
structural aspects of poverty in determining the overall outcome for any given country. In the first 
stage we “pretend” that every household in the economy is the same. This is effectively what is 
done by most researchers conducting analyses of multilateral trade liberalization. They ignore 
heterogeneity within the country and focus on changes in per capita  welfare across countries. The 
resulting percentage changes in the stratum poverty rates from Table 4 are reported in Table 5.  
From the results in Table 5, we see, not surprisingly, that poverty is reduced in all of the countries 
where per capita welfare rises. That is, in every case but Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. The 
percentage reduction in poverty varies across strata, because the distribution of income varies 
                                                                 
8 All of these price changes are before wholesale/retail/transport service margins, i.e. at producer prices. Consumer 
goods price changes are somewhat more ambiguous, as they involve a blend of goods and services price changes. 
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widely across strata. For example, in Indonesia, the poor households in the labor stratum are 
clustered relatively close to the poverty line, so the per capita  gain does more to reduce the 
poverty rate in this stratum than for the agriculture-specialized stratum where the poorest 
households are quite a bit poorer. The largest reductions in poverty arise in Vietnam, where we 
saw the largest percentage increases in real income (Table 3). 
The next poverty calculation that we perform involves taking explicit account of the differential 
spending patterns across households as income levels vary. As has been well known since the 
time Engel coined his famous “Law”, the poor tend to spend much more of their budget on food 
than do the rich. With food prices rising, relative to non-food prices, we expect that trade 
liberalization will hurt the poor – at least from the perspective of spending patterns. This is indeed 
the case when we compare the results in Table 5 with those in Table 6. The latter set of poverty 
results take explicit account of the spending patterns of the poor and we see poverty rates rising 
now in six of the fourteen countries. These are also the countries where relative food prices are 
rising strongly. The most dramatic case is that of Thailand, where the poverty rate reported in 
Table 4 increases by between 6% and 18%, depending on the stratum. This is due to the very 
sharp increase in staple grains prices. As a large exporter of rice, Thaila nd is quite exposed to 
world markets and the opening up of the Japanese and Korean rice markets gives a strong boost 
to prices in Thailand. With staple grains playing an especially large role in the consumption 
bundle of the poor, the ir cost of living is hard hit by global trade liberalization. In the remaining 
countries where poverty continues to fall, based on per capita  earnings changes and the true 
spending effects, the poverty rate falls by less than in Table 5. Clearly the fact that the poor are 
more exposed to food price increases works to their disadvantage in the context of global trade 
liberalization. 
We now turn our attention to the earnings side of the story. Tables 5 and 6 report estimated 
poverty impacts of trade liberalization based on per capita  earnings effects. However, we know 
from Table 3 that the earnings effects of trade liberalization differ greatly depending on the 
source of household income. With agricultural profits rising and non-agricultural profits falling, 
relative to per capita  income, there will clearly be distributional consequences of trade 
liberalization and impetus for further differential poverty impacts by stratum. Table 7 reports the 
percentage change in poverty headcount, by country and stratum, when households are assigned 
the stratum average change in income following trade liberalization. Thus, we ignore differences 
in earnings patterns within each stratum, but introduce cross-stratum differences when compared 
to Table 6. 
The results in Table 7 are quite interesting. No longer do poverty rates fall uniformly within each 
country. Poverty amongst agriculture-specialized households falls in every case but Mexico, Peru 
and Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, the poor are hard hit by rising consumer goods prices, 
coupled with falling relative returns to agriculture. In Mexico, poverty also increases amongst 
agricultural specialized households since per capita  welfare as well as the relative returns to 
agriculture fall (Table 3). The largest percentage reductions in poverty amongst agriculture-
specialized households are in Brazil and Chile, where agricultural profits rise strongly. Indeed, in 
Chile, which is heavily tied into world agricultural markets, the poverty rate for the agriculture 
specialized households reported in Table 4 falls by one-quarter. In light of the tendency for 
poverty to be stubbornly resistant to public policy, this is a very large change indeed. 
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With the average stratum earnings effects factored into our analysis, we see that the diversified 
households experience the next largest reductions in poverty. The low income diversified 
households are typically heavily reliant on agricultural profits and unskilled wages. Since these 
returns rise in most countries, poverty falls in the diverse stratum of every country except for 
Chile, Colombia, Peru and Thailand where rising food prices dominate the outcome.  
Poverty changes in the transfer stratum are unchanged from the previous table since transfers are 
assumed to move in proportion to the change in per capita income.9 Poverty falls for the transfer 
stratum in about half of the countries. Only five of the countries show a reduction in poverty for  
the non-agriculture specialized stratum, and the magnitude of the poverty changes for this group 
is much larger than for the transfer households. This is due to the volatility of non-agricultural 
profits in the face of trade liberalization. For example, in Chile, Indonesia and Thailand, this 
group experiences the largest overall increase poverty as households are hit by the combination of 
declining income and higher food prices. Finally, we have the labor-specialized households where 
the poverty rate rises in ten of the fourteen countries.  
The last step in this process of decomposing the determinants of stratum-specific poverty changes 
in the wake of trade liberalization involves introducing within stratum variation in income 
sources. This is done in Table 8. For example, within the wage labor specialized stratum, low 
income households tend to be more heavily reliant on unskilled, as opposed to skilled wages. 
With unskilled wages rising relative to skilled wages in twelve of the fourteen countries, the 
poorest wage-dependent households experience a somewhat larger gain, which results in a larger 
reduction (smaller increase) in poverty rates for this stratum (compare tables 7 and 8). The other 
stratum where the composition of income varies significantly across income levels is the 
diversified group. Here, poorer households tend to also be more heavily reliant on unskilled wage 
income, and they also tend to rely heavily on income from agricultural profits. In Chile and 
Colombia, this intra-stratum earnings effect is strong enough to turn a poverty increase into a 
reduction in poverty. 
Having established the likely change in poverty by stratum in each country of our sample, 
following trade liberalization, we are now in a position to examine more closely how these 
changes aggregate up to the national total. Here, the relative importance of each stratum in the 
overall poverty pic ture comes into play. A very simple way of approximating the total change in 
poverty reported in Table 8 is to weigh the poverty changes in that table by the stratum share in 
total poverty from Table 1 (middle entry in each cell). This gives us the estimate of the national 
change in poverty as reported in Table 9. (It differs slightly from the total poverty changes Table 
8, since the weights that we use change in the wake of trade liberalization.) 
Despite the fact that poverty rises in quite a few strata/country pairs, overall poverty falls in every 
case but Peru, Thailand and Venezuela. This is due to the fact that the reductions in poverty tend 
to occur in the strata in which the poor are most predominant. Consider, for example, the case of 
Indonesia. Here, poverty rises in the non-agriculture-specialized and transfer strata, but these 
account for only about fourteen percent of the poor, so overall poverty falls. In Brazil, poverty 
rises for the non-agriculture and labor strata, which together account for more than 45% of the 
                                                                 
9 Since we have also tied government spending and tax revenues to net national income, the same is true for public 
transfers. Since we do not have explicit information on the origin of private transfers, it seems reasonable to assume 
that they also depend on net national income in the economy. Since population is assumed to be unchanged, any change 
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poor, but the percentage reduction in poverty amongst the agriculture-specialized households is 
much larger, so while these households comprise only about one-quarter of the poor, overall 
poverty falls there as well. This stands in contrast to Venezuela, where the percentage reduction 
in agricultural poverty is quite large (about 9%), but this stratum only accounts for 2.5% of the 
poor. Not surprisingly, overall poverty rises there.  
This analysis leads us to an important thought experiment to uncover another aspect of the 
interaction between the structure of poverty and trade liberalization: What if, instead of their true 
stratum-weights in overall poverty, we instead applied the sample average weights given at the 
bottom of Table 1 (middle entry in each cell). On average, 56% of the poor households are 
specialized, with agriculture-specialized households being the largest component, followed by 
wage labor-specialized, non-agriculture and transfer specialized households. Applying the 
average weights yields the second column in Table 9.  
By applying the average weights instead of the true population weights to the stratum-specific 
poverty changes, we are able to isolate the role of inter-stratum poverty composition in 
determining the overall poverty changes. The most striking difference in the first and second 
columns of Table 9 is for Venezuela. Recall that in Venezuela, the percentage poverty reduction 
in the agricultural stratum is quite large, but the importance of this stratum in the overall poverty 
picture is very small. Therefore, overall poverty rises in Venezuela . If instead, the share of 
poverty amongst the agricultural stratum was as large as the sample average, then we predict 
(average weights column of Table 9) that national poverty would fall. Another interesting 
difference arises for Mexico, where the agricultural stratum contains only one percent of the poor, 
but poverty rises for this group. Applying the sample average weights in this case results in an 
overall poverty increase instead of a decrease.  
V. Conclusions  
 This study has explored the structure of poverty across fourteen developing countries 
and, against this back drop, it has examined the likely consequences of trade liberalization for the 
poor in these countries. Our analysis of household survey data shows that the poor tend to be 
more specialized in the earnings sources than the non-poor. This makes them more vulnerable to 
trade policy changes which tend to favor one sector at the expense of another. For the lowest 
income countries in our sample, agricultural specialized households make up a large share of the 
population, and an even larger share of the poor. The fact that trade liberalization tends to raise 
the profitability of agriculture means that poverty in this stratum generally falls, while poverty 
amongst the self-employed non-farm households often rises. Since the bulk of the poor are 
dependent on agriculture to some degree, the national poverty rate tends to fall in these cases. 
As countries become wealthier and the labor market becomes more highly developed, it is much 
more common to observe households that are entirely specialized in wage labor. Accordingly, 
these households also become a larger part of the overall poverty picture. Since the poorest labor-
specialized households tend to be heavily reliant on unskilled labor, the key earnings variable for 
reducing poverty is the wage paid to unskilled labor. In most cases, this wage falls, relative to 
average earnings, but it rises relative to skilled wages. Therefore the impact of trade liberalization 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
in net national income translates directly into a change in per capita income. 
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on this group of households is mixed, with the poverty increases more frequent than the 
decreases.  
The findings in this paper have emphasized the differential short run impacts of multilateral trade 
liberalization on poverty across countries, across strata, and within strata, thereby highlighting the 
links between the structure of poverty and the national impacts of trade liberalization. 10 In the 
long run, when self-employed workers, land and capital investments are able to fully adjust to the 
trade policy shock, the results can be significantly altered (Hertel et al., 2003). But we believe 
that for households living on less than one dollar per day, the short run impacts are of paramount 
importance. 
Our cross-country analysis also permits us to address a number of myths surrounding trade 
liberalization and poverty. The first myth is that trade liberalization always benefits developing 
countries as a whole. While this is generally true in our analysis, the most notable exception is 
that of Mexico. While global trade liberalization benefits the Mexican economy by increasing 
economic efficiency, it costs Mexico its preferred access to the US and Canadian markets. That 
is, many of the benefits of NAFTA are lost when other countries obtain tariff free access to this 
same market. 
A second myth relates to the popular saying  that “a rising tide lifts all boats”. While it is 
generally true that the countries that experience a per capita  gain also experience a reduction in 
poverty, Thailand offers an important exception. Here, the very sharp rise in staple grains prices 
following global trade liberalization pushes more non-agricultural households into poverty and 
this effect dominates the reduction in poverty among agr iculture-specialized households. On the 
other hand, in the case of Mexico, poverty falls despite the decline in per capita welfare 
following global trade liberalization. This is due to the decline in food prices that results from 
lower cost imports. 
The falling relative price of food and the decline in relative earnings in agriculture in the Mexican 
case serve to rebut yet another common myth, namely that global trade liberalization will always 
benefit agricultural producers at the expense of urban consumers. While this rule of thumb is 
generally true, it does depend on the existing pattern of protection in the economy, as well as the 
nature of its current trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA). Vietnam also offers an additional, 
interesting exception to this myth. Global trade liberalization confers a huge boost to that 
economy and the agricultural sector is simply left behind, with wages and consumer prices 
outstripping increases in agricultural profits so that the poverty rate amongst agriculture-
specia lized households actually rises in spite of the strong national gains. 
The final myth that this paper addresses is the assertion that reducing poverty in agriculture will 
unambiguously reduce national poverty and increasing poverty in agriculture will increase 
national poverty. There are four exceptions to this rule amongst our sample of fourteen countries. 
In Thailand and Venezuela, the poverty rate falls for agriculture-specialized households, but 
national poverty rises, due largely to higher food prices. Conversely, in the cases of Mexico and 
Vietnam, poverty rises amongst agriculture-specialized households, as relative farm earnings 
decline, but national poverty falls in spite of this outcome 
                                                                 
10 See also Kanbur (2000) for a similar plea for disaggregation in the analysis of poverty. 
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Figure 1.  Correlation Between Per Capita GDP and the Share of agr Specialized 








Figure 3.  Correlation Between the Share of agr Specialized Households in the Population 
and Their Share in the Poor 
 
 




Figure 5.  Total poverty rate vs. poverty rate among transfer specialized households (line 
denotes locus of points with equal poverty rates)  
 
 
Figure 6.  Total poverty rate vs. poverty rate among agr specialized households (line 
denotes locus of points with equal poverty rates) 
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Figure 7.  Total poverty rate vs. poverty rate among diversified households (line denotes 
locus of points with equal poverty rates) 
 
 
Figure 8.  Total poverty rate vs. poverty rate among labor specialized households (line 
denotes locus of points with equal poverty rates)   
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Figure 9.  Total poverty rate vs. poverty rate among nonagr specialized households (line 





Table 1.  Structure of Poverty in Fourteen Developing Countries 
 
                                  Stratum  
Share of total population 
Agricul-
tural 
Nonagr. Labor Transfer Diversified Total 
Share of total poverty 
GDP PPP 
per capita 
            
Poverty rate Gini Coef.             
660 0.38 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.35 =1 
  0.49 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.31 =1 Malawi 
  
0.8271 
0.82 0.80 0.26 0.77 0.59 0.65 
870 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.05 0.26 =1 
  0.28 0.25 0.19 0.06 0.22 =1 Zambia 
  
0.6867 
0.95 0.72 0.61 0.95 0.61 0.73 
1200 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.83 =1 
  0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.82 =1 Uganda 
  
0.6446 
0.46 0.27 0.25 0.75 0.36 0.37 
1750 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.56 =1 
  0.14 0.11 0.23 0.03 0.50 =1 Bangladesh 
  
0.4695 
0.35 0.20 0.46 0.42 0.26 0.29 
2100 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.87 =1 
  0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.84 =1 Vietnam 
  
0.5096 
0.60 0.22 0.51 0.73 0.36 0.37 
3000 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.01 0.44 =1 
  0.34 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.45 =1 Indonesia 
  
0.4266 
0.25 0.11 0.06 0.30 0.15 0.15 
4000 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.66 =1 
  0.23 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.65 =1 Philippines 
  
0.5141 
0.31 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.12 
4800 0.11 0.21 0.15 0.05 0.49 =1 
  0.09 0.23 0.04 0.26 0.38 =1 Peru 
  
0.5489 
0.13 0.17 0.04 0.80 0.12 0.16 
6100 0.04 0.19 0.35 0.06 0.36 =1 
  0.03 0.13 0.49 0.21 0.14 =1 Venezuela 
  
0.4913 
0.16 0.16 0.33 0.78 0.09 0.23 
6300 0.11 0.23 0.28 0.05 0.33 =1 
  0.26 0.43 0.10 0.10 0.12 =1 Colombia 
  
0.4695 
0.46 0.37 0.07 0.37 0.07 0.20 
6600 0.05 0.08 0.21 0.05 0.61 =1 
  0.03 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.74 =1 Thailand 
  
0.5391 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 
7400 0.04 0.10 0.35 0.11 0.40 =1 
  0.24 0.15 0.31 0.10 0.20 =1 Brazil 
  
0.5369 
0.30 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 
9000 0.03 0.11 0.38 0.08 0.41 =1 
  0.01 0.02 0.35 0.25 0.37 =1 Mexico 
  
0.7346 
0.06 0.02 0.15 0.52 0.15 0.16 
10000 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.05 0.55 =1 
  0.15 0.04 0.19 0.24 0.39 =1 Chile 
  
0.5457 
0.09 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.04 
4556 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.04 0.51 =1 





0.35 0.23 0.20 0.48 0.21 0.25 
4692 0.10 0.12 0.22 0.04 0.51 =1 
  0.19 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.45 =1 
Population 
Weighted 
Average   
0.5231 
0.29 0.14 0.17 0.34 0.16 0.18 
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Table 2.  Average Rates of Import Protection, by Sector and Country 
Country Share in World 
Exports 
Primary AG Primary Nonag Proc food Textiles, apparel Other Manuf. 
Malawi 0.000 23 12 24 35 22 
Uganda 0.000 40 13 15 19 16 
Zambia 0.000 6 13 11 20 13 
Rest of Subsah. Africa 0.014 19 11 24 21 13 
Bangladesh 0.001 14 20 24 29 15 
Indonesia 0.009 7 7 15 16 10 
Philippines 0.008 14 7 18 14 6 
Thailand 0.012 22 11 37 27 13 
Vietnam 0.002 14 15 43 34 14 
Rest of Asia* 0.123 22 9 16 16 7 
Brazil 0.013 8 8 16 15 19 
Chile 0.004 11 11 12 11 11 
Colombia 0.003 13 10 19 17 12 
Mexico 0.017 18 3 31 4 3 
Peru 0.002 14 12 14 16 13 
Venezuela 0.003 13 11 16 18 16 
Rest of America** 0.020 10 10 18 19 14 
Other LDC's 0.046 39 10 54 19 10 
OECD*** 0.702 16 2 21 10 2 
Former Soviet Union 0.021 7 7 10 17 10 
World 1.000 18 4 22 12 4 
Share of Total Exports  0.05 0.35 0.06 0.07 0.47 
*Excludes Japan, Korea in OECD      
**Excludes USA, Canada in OECD      
***Excludes Mexico       
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Table 3.  Impacts of Global Trade Liberalization on Key Variables (% Change) 
 Per capita Effects  Relative Earnings Impacts  Relative Spending Impacts 
Country Earnings CPI Real In  agrprofit nagprofit unsklabor sklabor food Mnfcs svces  
Bangladesh -1.7 -2.0 0.3  0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -7.8 2.1 
Brazil 1.2 0.3 0.9  12.5 -1.4 -1.1 -1.1 4.0 -3.4 0.4 
Chile 3.5 3.4 0.1  16.8 -1.8 -0.7 -1.8 5.4 -4.9 0.4 
Colombia -0.2 -0.6 0.3  9.8 -1.0 -0.6 -1.1 2.3 -3.5 0.8 
Indonesia 4.2 3.5 0.7  1.5 -0.7 0.8 0.1 2.8 -7.5 0.5 
Malawi 3.1 0.9 2.2  7.8 -5.1 -0.2 -1.7 5.7 -10.3 3.5 
Mexico -2.5 -2.3 -0.2  -2.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.9 -1.3 1.0 
Peru 5.4 6.3 -1.0  0.6 0.0 -1.3 -2.0 11.3 -5.3 -2.1 
Philippines 3.0 2.9 0.1  2.7 -0.8 0.9 -1.2 2.1 -6.0 0.9 
Thailand 1.7 0.5 1.2  6.7 -0.7 -0.1 -2.4 2.3 -5.2 3.9 
Uganda 2.9 2.5 0.5  -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.6 1.0 -7.6 0.3 
Venezuela 0.4 0.4 0.0  5.8 -0.5 -0.6 -1.3 0.8 -2.6 1.0 
Vietnam 49.9 37.8 12.0  -22.6 0.6 3.5 0.1 -10.3 -39.8 24.2 
Zambia 3.0 2.2 0.9  1.7 -1.1 -1.3 -1.3 1.5 -4.7 0.5 
 
 
Table 4. Poverty Headcount As A Proportion Of Total Population, By Country And Stratum 
 Total Agr Nagr Labor Transf Diverse 
Bangladesh 0.29 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.14 
Brazil 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Chile 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Colombia 0.20 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Indonesia 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 
Malawi 0.65 0.32 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.20 
Mexico 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.06 
Peru 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06 
Philippines 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 
Thailand 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Uganda 0.37 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.30 
Venezuela 0.23 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.03 
Vietnam 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.31 
Zambia 0.73 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.16 
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Table 5.  Impact of Per Capita Earnings and Spending Effects on Poverty (Change in 
Number of Poor, Relative to Total Population, in Percent) 
Country Total Agr Nagr Labor Transf Diverse 
Bangladesh  -0.5 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 
Brazil  -1.1 -0.9 -1.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 
Chile  -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Columbia  -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 -0.6 
Indonesia  -1.5 -1.4 -1.6 -1.9 -1.3 -1.5 
Malawi  -1.0 -0.7 -0.4 -2.9 -0.5 -1.5 
Mexico  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 
Peru  0.3 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 
Philippines  -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 
Thailand  -1.6 -3.7 -2.5 -1.8 -1.4 -1.4 
Uganda  -0.6 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 -0.6 
Venezuela  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Vietnam  -15.1 -7.2 -16.8 -9.7 -4.2 -16.3 




Table 6.  Impact of Per Capita Earnings and True Spending Effects on Poverty (Change 
in Number of Poor, Relative to Total Population, in Percent) 
Country Total Agr Nagr Labor Transf Diverse 
Bangladesh  -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Brazil  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Chile  1.5 2.7 1.6 1.5 0.7 1.6 
Columbia  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Indonesia  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Malawi  -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -1.4 -0.2 -0.7 
Mexico  -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 -0.5 
Peru  1.4 3.0 1.1 2.4 0.6 1.8 
Philippines  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Thailand  7.6 18.2 12.3 8.6 6.9 6.9 
Uganda  -0.7 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.2 -0.7 
Venezuela  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Vietnam  -13.8 -6.6 -14.8 -8.9 -3.8 -14.8 




Table 7.  Impact of Stratum Average Earnings and True Spending Effects on Poverty 
(Change in Number of Poor, Relative to Total Population, in Percent) 
Country Total Agr Nagr Labor Transf Diverse 
Bangladesh  -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Brazil  -2.8 -14.0 1.8 1.2 0.1 -0.2 
Chile  -2.6 -26.2 3.2 2.6 0.6 1.2 
Columbia  -2.1 -9.2 0.4 1.4 -0.1 0.1 
Indonesia  -1.2 -2.8 1.2 -1.3 0.2 -0.6 
Malawi  -1.8 -2.8 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -1.4 
Mexico  -0.3 2.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.2 -0.2 
Peru  1.5 2.1 0.9 4.3 0.6 2.0 
Philippines  -1.4 -5.9 0.9 0.3 0.0 -0.1 
Thailand  7.0 -4.6 13.0 10.5 6.9 6.7 
Uganda  -0.7 -0.3 -1.2 -0.9 -0.2 -0.8 
Venezuela  0.3 -9.6 0.4 1.0 0.1 -0.1 
Vietnam  -7.7 10.8 -21.1 -10.6 -3.8 -8.5 




Table 8.  Impact of True Earnings and Spending Effects on Poverty (Change in Number 
of Poor, Relative to Total Population, in Percent) 
Country Total Agr Nagr Labor Transf Diverse 
Bangladesh  -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Brazil  -2.4 -11.4 2.9 1.2 0.1 -2.2 
Chile  -3.9 -25.0 3.4 2.3 0.7 -2.4 
Columbia  -2.2 -8.9 0.5 1.0 -0.1 -2.1 
Indonesia  -1.5 -2.8 1.8 -1.6 0.2 -1.4 
Malawi  -2.0 -2.6 0.4 -0.7 -0.2 -2.5 
Mexico  -0.2 2.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.2 0.2 
Peru  1.4 2.2 1.1 3.9 0.6 1.8 
Philippines  -3.1 -5.2 1.1 -0.9 0.0 -3.0 
Thailand  5.7 -0.2 13.6 8.8 6.9 4.9 
Uganda  -0.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.7 -0.2 -0.5 
Venezuela  0.3 -9.1 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.5 
Vietnam  -5.6 10.9 -16.0 -11.1 -3.8 -6.1 
Zambia  0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 
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Table 9. Approximating National Poverty Changes using True vs. Sample Average 
Population Weights for Each Stratum 
Country True weights Average weights True/Average 
Bangladesh -0.10 -0.13 1.25 
Brazil -2.39 -2.41 1.01 
Chile -3.87 -4.54 1.17 
Colombia -2.23 -2.27 1.02 
Indonesia -1.47 -1.11 0.76 
Malawi -2.03 -1.61 0.79 
Mexico -0.21 0.27 -1.27 
Peru 1.43 2.00 1.39 
Philippines -3.14 -2.23 0.71 
Thailand 5.68 5.93 1.04 
Uganda -0.49 -0.50 1.02 
Venezuela 0.34 -1.16 -3.38 
Vietnam -5.60 -4.92 0.88 
Zambia -0.01 -0.03 4.20 
 
 
  
 
